Who\u27s in Charge of U.S. Indian Policy?: Congress and the Supreme Court at Loggerheads over American Indian Religious Freedom by Wilkins, David E.
University of Richmond 
UR Scholarship Repository 
Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, 
book chapters and other publications Jepson School of Leadership Studies 
1992 
Who's in Charge of U.S. Indian Policy?: Congress and the Supreme 
Court at Loggerheads over American Indian Religious Freedom 
David E. Wilkins 
University of Richmond, dwilkins@richmond.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Leadership Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wilkins, David E. “Who’s in Charge of U.S. Indian Policy? Congress and the Supreme Court at Loggerheads 
Over American Indian Religious Freedom.” Wicazo Sa Review 8, no. 1 (April 1992), 40-64. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at UR Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and 
other publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu. 
 Who's in Charge of U.S. Indian Policy?
 Congress and the Supreme Court at
 Loggerheads Over American Indian Religious
 Freedom
 by David Wilkins, Ph.D.
 Our interest in Indian self-government today is not the interest of sentimentalists or antiquarians.
 We have a vital concern with Indian self-government because the Indian is to America what the
 Jew was to the Russian Czars and Hitler's Germany. For us, the Indian tribe is the miner's canary
 and when it flutters and droops we know that the poison gasses of intolerance threaten all other
 minorities in our land. And who of us is not a member of some minority? (Cohen, 1949:313-314).
 A prophet is not respected in his own country (John 4: 44).
 Introduction
 The federal government's three branches--executive, legislative, judicial, and that unwieldy mass known
 simply as "the bureaucracy" have, during the last half-decade--1987-1991--produced a dizzying crop of laws,
 policies, proclamations, regulations, and court decisions which have served simultaneously to 1) reaffirm
 tribal sovereignty; 2) permit and encourage greater state interference within Indian Country; 3) enhance
 federal legislative authority over tribes; and 4) deny constitutional free-exercise religious protections both to
 individual Indians and to tribes.
 On the legislative side, Congress has established the experimental Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration
 Project (102 St. 2285, 2296; as amended 105 St. 1278) which is a major step towards restoring the tribal right
 of self-determination, and is discussing the potentiality of reestablishing a more constitutionally-grounded
 policy with tribes--"New Federalism." This policy would resemble the bilateral agreement period between
 tribes and the U.S. which lasted from 1875 to 1914 (Senate Report, No. 101-216, 1989:16; see S.2512 "New
 Federalism for American Indian Act, April 25, 1990).
 These legislative developments and policy discussions were preceded by two 1987 congressional resolu-
 tions, one joint, the other a Senate concurrent resolution, which reaffirmed the political nature of the
 tribal-federal relationship. First, Public Law 10-67 (101 St. 386), a joint resolution commemorating the
 bicentennial of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, enacted July 10,1987, reaffirmed the Northwest Ordinance
 as one of the fundamental legal documents of the United States.
 The original legislation, the articles of which were to "forever remain unalterable, unless by common
 consent" (1 St. 50 52) provided civil government for the Northwest Territory, and also included a declaration
 by the federal government and its people to "democratic principles, religious freedom, and individual rights"
 (101 St. 386). More importantly, the Ordinance enunciated the fundamental political premise--consent--
 upon which subsequent federal Indian policy was to be based:
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 The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property
 shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty,
 they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress;
 but laws founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs
 being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them... (1 St. 50, 52).
 Ivo months after this establishment of policy, on September 16,1987, Senator Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii),
 along with eighteen others introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 76 which acknowledged 1) the Iroquois
 Confederacy and other tribes' democratic traditesions played in the formation of the
 U.S. Constitution; 2) the "government-to-government" relationship between tribes and the federal govern-
 ment; 3) the federal government's continuing legal obligations to tribal nations in the areas of health,
 education, economic assistance, and cultural identity; and finally a statement reaffirming the recently
 commemorated Northwest Ordinance provision on the federal government's need to exercise the "utmost
 good faith" in upholding its treaties with tribal nations.
 The year 1987 was also interesting because it signalled the start (it was a two-year study) of yet another
 (42 preceded this one) congressional investigation (Senate Report, 101-216,1989: 236-238) of the corruption,
 fraud, incompetence, and mismanagement lacing the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and other federal
 agencies that deal with tribes and individual Indians in several areas--economic development and Indian
 preference contracting, Indian child sexual abuse, Indian natural resource issues, Indian health, Indian
 housing, and tribal elite corruption. (The Senate's investigation will be discussedSenate's investigation will be discussed in more detail later in this
 article.)
 Not surprisingly, the Special Committee on Investigations, co-chaired by Arizona's own sometimes
 beleaguered senatorial delegation, Messrs. DeConcini and McCain of the Senate Select Committee on Indian
 Affairs, which conducted the study, was not directed as part of their congressional mandate to investigate the
 impact of decisions handed down by their sister institution, the Supreme Court. The three branches of the
 federal government historically, though not always consistently, have operated from a similar set of intellec-
 tual, political, and cultural premises when it comes to developing, implementing, and evaluating programs
 and policies for America's indigenous peoples. This is not at all unusual considering that the three branches
 constitute the ruling national coalition of American plcoalition of American politics. And the Supreme Court, like other political
 institutions, as Dahl noted, "is a member of such ruling coalitions, and as such its decisions are typically
 supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions" (1957: 293).
 In addition, and even more intriguing, the Special Committee did not feel called to ascertain the impact
 of various supreme court opinions on tribal rights largely because the judicial branch had not yet explicitly
 embarked on its imperialistic quest to disregard the rights of tribes and their citizens in several areas of law:
 non-member Indian criminal jurisdiction (Duro v. Reina, 58 USLW 4643 (1990)), double taxation (Cotton
 Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 57 USLW 4445 (1989)), zoning regulations of Indian land (Brendale v.
 Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima, 109 S.Ct. 2994 (1989)), and most significantly, the free exercise of
 religion (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Employment
 Division v. Sith, 108 L.Ed 2d. 876 (1990)). On the contrary, the contrary, the Court in 1987 handed down two opinions
 which were generally supportive of tribal rights regarding the expansive parameters of tribal court jurisdiction
 (Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1986)) and the right of tribal governments to regulate
 gaming in Indian country free from state and local government interference (Califoria v. Cabazon, 55 USLW
 4225 (1987)).
 Nineteen eighty-eight, however, signalled the advent of the political branches (Congress and Executive)1
 and the judicial branch heading in radically divergent directions in the several areas of law mentioned above,
 but most dangerously in the sensitive area of religious freedom for Indians. In Lyng the Supreme Court in a
 majority opinion held that the constitution's free exercise clause did not prevent tgovernmental destruction
 of the most sacred sites of three small tribes in northern California. The majority made this ruling in full
 realization that the activity of the U.S. Forest Service--construction of a six-mile road--would virtually destroy
 the Indian's ability to practice their religion.
 Also, in April 1988, and just eight days after Lyng, the Supreme Court in Employmnent Division v. Smith
 (485 U.S. 660--also known as Smith I) granted certiorari and then remanded the case back to the Oregon
 Supreme Court for a determination as to whether the Oregon statute criminalizing peyote provided an
 exception for religious use. The Court suggested that "if Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote,
 and if that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that
 conduct in Oregon" (p. 672).
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 Conversely, one day after Smith I, on April 28,1988, Congress enacted a Comprehensive Elementary and
 Secondary education law (102 St. 130), which contained a provision of largely symbolic significance: 'The
 Congress," it was declared, "hereby repudiates and rejects House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83rd
 Congress and any policy of unilateral termination of federal relations with any Indian nation." The essence
 of unilateral termination, an aberrant and short-lived federal policy, was gutted in 1958 when Secretary of
 Interior Fred A. Seaton stated that termination acts would not be enacted without the full consent of the
 Indians concerned (quoted in Prucha, 1990: 240-241). It was later verbally discredited by Presidents Nixon
 in 1970 and Reagan in 1983 in their Indian policy statements. It had not, however, been officially rejected by
 the body which had created it.
 Besides the belated expulsion of the termination resolution, the year witnessed amendments to several
 existing laws (Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 101 St. 1788; Indian Housing Act, 102 St. 676; Education
 Amendments Act, 102 St. 1603; Indian Financing Act, 102 St. 1763; Indian Self-Determination Amendments,
 102 St. 2285; Indian Reorganization Act Amendments, 102 St. 2938; Navajo & Hopi Indian Relocation and
 Amendments Act, 102 St. 3929; and Indian Health Care Act Amendments, 102 St. 4784), the enactment of
 several laws to settle claims, or to expand, protect, or create Indian reservations (Land taken into trust for
 Pechanga Band of Luiseno Mission Indians, 102 St. 897; Land Claim of Coushatta Tribe of Louisiana, 102 St.
 1097; Reservation for Confederated Tribe of Grande Ronde Community of Oregon, 102 St. 1594; and Quinault
 Reservation Expansion Act, 102 St. 3327), and finally, the enactment of new legislation on important issues
 in the areas of political recognition (Lac Vieux Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 102 St. 1577),
 economic development (Economic Development Plan for the Northwestern Shoshone, 102 St. 1575), gam-
 bling (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102 St. 2467), and water rights (Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights
 Settlement Act, 102 St. 2973).
 The congressional enactments cited above vary in importance and substance. Several of them, in fact,
 are merely minor modifications of preexisting legislation that have had negligible impact in improving either
 tribal socio-economic conditions or the structural relationship between tribes and the U.S. Other laws,
 meanwhile, are now considered by many Indians and tribal governments as nothing more than fresh and
 violative incursions into tribal sovereign rights (i.e., the Indian Gaming Act). Nevertheless, when compared
 with the Supreme Court's dynamic duo--Lyng and Smith Il--it is overwhelmingly evident that the Congress
 at least is attempting to address and resolve certain issues of importance to tribes while the Supreme Court
 seems bent on shattering the always tenuous set of tribal sovereign rights as well as the constitutional rights
 American Indian individuals are ostensibly entitled to as federal and state citizens.2
 The Problem
 This article's principal question is: What explains the disparity between the way the Congress
 conceptualizes and deals with tribal sovereignty and the associated religious and cultural practices of tribes
 and tribal individuals, and the way the Supreme Court addresses and decides the same issues? This is an
 especially critical question because constitutionally Congress is the only branch empowered to treat with
 tribes who historically were dealt with at arm's length through treaties and agreements as separate sovereigns.
 For generations, (with some few exceptions) the courts relied on the
 For generations, (with some few exceptions) the political question doctrine and generally deferred to Congress in the
 courts relied on the political question doctrine handling of Indian related issues. And for just as many generations, but
 and generally deferred to Congress in the han- particularly after 1871 when Congress froze the treaty process (16 St. 544,
 dling of Indian related issues. 566), tribal people and other interested commentators have argued that
 this judicial deference to the legislature left tribes without legal redress for
 many issues (Coulter, 1977; Shattuck & Norgren, 1979; Newton, 1984); Today, however, the court, while still
 sometimes deferring to Congress, has begun to forcefully articulate its own policy position regarding tribal
 status and rights; policy statements which, at least insofar as aboriginal religious rights are concerned, have
 largely shredded those rights.
 Our major question necessarily generates a set of subsidiary questions which must also be addressed:
 What is the actual relationship between Congress and American Indian tribes and their citizens? Is Congress
 as supportive of tribal autonomy as it seems? If so, and since Congress is vested with the constitutional
 authority to develop policies relating to tribes, how do we explain the recent spate of Supreme Court decisions,
 particularly Lyng and Smith, which deny constitutional protections to American Indians and ignore congres-
 sionally generated (i.e., American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469,1978) legislative protec-
 tions of tribal rights as well? Why, after nearly two centuries of generally consolidated (all three branches
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 working together) federal efforts to 1) obliterate tribalism by assimilation or termination, or 2) implement
 and sustain federal programs of paternalism which kept tribes locked in dependency relations, or 3) generate
 programs and policies which support tribal autonomy by recognizing Indian political and legal rights, and
 cultural distinctiveness, or 4) some interesting melange of multiple federal policies with cross-cutting
 objectives, is the Congress attempting to resuscitate the negotiated agreement process with tribes while the
 Court, on the contrary, is actively engaged in a systematic effort to withdraw or deny American Indians and
 tribal groups religious freedom?
 Scholarly Findings And Expectations
 Because of the profundity of the subject under examination, religious freedom, a wealth of scholarly
 literature has been generated on the topic. Within the last five years alone--1987-1991--some thirty-two law
 review articles were published dealing with the subject of Indian religious issues, excluding Deloria's works
 which will be treated separately (see Index to Legal Periodicals). The majority of these focus on interpreta-
 tions and explanations of various supreme court cases involving the free exercise clause and Indian religion
 cases (e.g., Loftin, 1989; Wyatt, 1989; Collins, 1990; Gordon, 1991; Perry, 1991; Lawson and Morris, 1991;
 Echo-Hawk, 1991; Perry, 1991; and Rawlings, 1991). Other articles have focused on topics such as sacred
 lands (Brooks, 1990); repatriation of Indians remains (Ravesloot, 1990; Boyd, 1990; and Echo-Hawk, 1990);
 problems with application and enforcement of the American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution (Boyles,
 1991); and general congressional policy fluctuations over time and their impact on tribal religious beliefs and
 practices (Martin, 1990).
 Besides the scholarly literature, the federal government's various congressional committees and subcom-
 mittees and other federal administrators have also produced a large amount of documentation on the subject,
 both historically and currently. Table I depicts the major treaties, laws, and broader policies crafted by the
 United States in the last two hundred years which have directly affected the religious beliefs, practices, and
 sacred sites of Indians. Table II, more specifically portrays the most recent legislative efforts to either modify
 the existing religious freedom law (the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469) or
 to overturn or legislatively circumvent those Supreme Court cases which have devastated Indian religious
 rights. Furthermore, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs has held two separate hearings (Hearing
 100-879 on S. 2250, May 18,1988) and (Hearing 101514 on S. 1124, Sept. 28,1989) on ways to "ensure that the
 management of federal lands does not undermine and frustrate traditional native American religious
 practices."
 These studies and reports, both private and public, have facilitated a deeper awareness of the complex
 face of tribal and individual Indian efforts to practice aboriginal religion in the face of private, corporate,
 state, and federal agency pressure which often clashes with such practices. They have also illuminated the
 U.S. Constitution's highly problematic ability to protect even individual Indian religious beliefs and practices.
 Finally, they help explain why various federal court decisions have been handed down which adversely affect
 tribal religious practices. However, typically they inadequately treat the complexities and dedistinctive featureat the complexities and distinctive features
 of the broader tribal-federal relationship by failing to place the issue of religious freedom within a larger
 theoretical, historical, political, and philosophical context. Moreover, since the bulk of existing scholarship
 is authored, edited, or coordinated by non-Indians they inadequately portray the moral and cultural authority
 of articles, monographs, and books authored by tribal individuals.
 One individual whose scholarship meets and exceeds these thresholds is Vine Deloria, Jr., a Standing
 Rock Sioux. From his early writing on religious issues (God is Red, 1973; The Metaphysics of Modem Existence,
 1979) to his most recent work in the field ("A Simple Question of Humanity: The Moral Dimension of the
 Reburial Issue," 1989; "The Reflection and Revelation: Knowing Land, Places, and Ourselves," 1991; "Sacred
 Lands and Religious Freedom," 1991; "Worshipping the Golden Calf: Freedom of Religion is Scalia's
 America," 1991; and "Trouble in High Places: Erosion of American Indian Rights to Religious Freedom in
 the U.S.," 1992), Deloria has employed an eclectic and contextualistic style to write about an amazingly d;verse
 set of topics and issues besides religion. He has, for example, published works in the areas of political science
 (political theory, American politics, Marxism), law, history, education, economics, philosophy, sociology,
 minority affairs, popular culture, and environmental affairs. Deloria has noted on several occasions the
 improbability of anyone developing comprehension about the cultural, legal, and political status of tribes in
 the United States without in depth reference and analysis of, at a minimum, history, economics, politics, and
 morality (1989b: 223).
 In fact, in a recent article on the problems associated with the current practice and interpretation of
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 Table I:
 Congressional Activity Regarding American Indian Religious Freedom
 Major Treaties and Laws Major Eederal Indian Policies
 Treaty between Kaskaskia Tribe of Illinois and
 U.S. in 1803--contained provision in which the
 U.S. agreed to pay for services of a Catholic
 priest (Kappler, 1903:50)
 American Board of Commissioners for foreign mis-
 sions establish first mission in Indian Country at
 Brainerd, Tennessee (1816). (Received financial
 support from the federal government.)
 Civilization Fund Act, 3 St. 516-17 (Mar 3,1819)
 [Between 1819 and 1842, the U.S. provided
 $214,500 to missionary societies for the education
 of Indians ] Source: Schmeckebier, 1927:40.
 [Numerous treaties, i.e., Treaty with the Omaha
 Tribe, 1854, and Treaty with the Shawnee (Kap-
 pler, 1903:456, 460) contained provisions
 whereby the U.S. gave thle fee-simple title of sec-
 tions of Indian land to various Christian
 denominations engaged in proselytizing and
 educating Indians.]
 President Grant's Peace Policy (assigned Indian
 agencies to Christian denominations) Messages and
 Papers of the Presidents, Vol. 7, pp. 109-110, (Dec. 5,
 1870).
 Courts of Indian Offenses (Sec. of Interior, Annual
 Report, Nov. 1, 1883).
 Sectarian schools no longer to be funded by U.S., 30
 St. 62, 79 (June 7, 1897) [Note: This was repealed
 March 30, 1968, 82 St. 71].
 Rations to mission schools, 34 St. 326 (June 21,
 1906).
 Patents of lands to missionary boards of
 religious organizations, 42 St. 995 (Sept. 21,
 1922)
 Comm. of Indian Affairs, John Collier, issues Cir-
 cular No. 2970, "Indian Religious Freedom and In-
 dian Culture," (1933) which stated that Indian
 religion would no longer be interfered with (Prucha,
 1984; Vol. 2, pp. 951-952).
 Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 St. 73, 77 (1968).
 American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92
 St. 469 (Aug. 11, 1978).
 Native American Graves Protection and
 Repatriation Act, 104 St. 3048 (Nov. 16, 1990).
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 Indian law, Deloria says that "[t]he mythical, doctrinally determined history [tihe mythical, doctrinally determined history
 which is now entrenched in federal Indian law will be replaced with a more which is now entrenched in federal Indian law will
 accurate history only with exceptional difficulty and hardship" (1989b: 223). which is noeplaced th a more accurate l ndian law with
 In an earlier article which focused on the question of religion, Deloria more exceptional difficulty and hardship
 explicitly observed that:
 On balance, the difficulty and of defining the rights or religious freedom for Indians appears to
 lie in accommodating the free exercise clause and the establishing clause so that Indians will have
 sufficient leeway to exercise their rights without falling under one of the traditional categories of
 prohibitions. We must learn how to phrase questions of Indian religious freedom so that we can
 begin to achieve the proper results. We must first raise fundamental questions regarding the
 nature of all Indian rights: social, political, economic, educational, and religious. We must ask
 how Indians received these rights, why they differ in degree and kind from the civil rights of other
 American citizens, and how they can be clarified and thereby protected and enforced" (1985:
 238).
 Mindful of Deloria's admonitions, we focus in the remainder of this article less on doctrinal analysis of
 individual Supreme Court cases, since their is ample literature on that, and more on establishing the larger
 theoretical, political, institutional, and practical dimensions of this subject so that the question of why
 indigenous people currently aree denied constituti iona of their right to practice their religion in a
 constitutional democracy can be explained. We begin, therefore, with a discussion of the tribal-congressional
 relationship.
 THibes As Extra-Constitutional Entities
 Chief Justice John Marshall once posited that "the relation of the Indians to the United States [was]
 marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S.
 (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). In penning this striking passage Marshall attempted to define, for the federal government,
 the novel political relationship in exist-
 Thble II ence between Tribes and the United
 Recent and Current Bills Involving States. The case and Marshall's inventive
 Indian Religious Questions passage are frequently cited even today
 by policy-makers, commentators, and
 H.R. 1546: Amend the American Indian Religious scholars who wrestle with the idea of ra-
 Freedom Act of 1978" (March 21, cially-based tribal nations, the majority of
 1989) whom are completely land-locked by
 H.R. 5377 "Protect Free Exercise of Religion" (July 26, both state and federal jurisdictions. A
 1990) majority of the tribes operate under their
 H.R. 2797 "Religious Freedom Restoration Act of own constitutions and they continue to
 1991" (June 26, 1991) exercise a myriad of governmental
 H.R. 4040 "Religous Freedom Act of 1991" (Nov. 26, powers, some of which may legally con-
 1991) flict with the United States Constitution.3
 Of more importance, Marshall's
 S. 2250 "Improvement of the American Indian phraseology compels one to ask a deeper
 Religious Freedom Act" (March 31, set of questions. Is the tribal-federal
 1988) relationship as unique as Marshall as-
 S. 1124 'The American Indian Religious Freedom Act serted? If so, why? If not, why did he say
 Amendments of 1989" (June 6, 1989) it was? What, more precisely, urged
 S. 1979 "Amendments to the American Indian Marshall initially, and succeeding
 Religious Freedom Act" (Nov. 21, generations of scholars, politicians, ad-
 1989) ministrators, and jurists to conclude that
 S. 1980 "Repatriation of Native American Group or "peculiar and cardinal distinctions" mark
 Cultural Patrimony" (Nov. 21, 1989) the tribal-federal relationship? What are
 S. 110 "Amendments of American Indian Religious some of these "peculiarities"? Is it the
 Freedom Act"' (January 14, 1991) racial dimension; is it the distinctive
 governmental dimension of tribal life and
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 the pre- and extra-constitutional connection tribes have to the federal government, evidenced by hundreds
 of treaties; is it the sheer volume of separate tribal groups and nations (over 500 at last count); or is it because
 over time the Supreme Court has generated a conflicting set of legal fictions and non-constitutional principles
 and doctrines (i.e., the "doctrine of discovery," "domestic-dependent" status, "dependency-wardship," etc.)
 that acknowledge tribes and their political and property rights as exiting outside the protection of either the
 federal constitution or international law?
 Actually, it can be, and often is, a strange and vacillating combination of all the above, with an emphasis,
 _ we would argue, on the Court's innovative ability to develop legal doctrines
 Marshall...is the principal federal figure respon- justifying, on the one hand, the imposition of federal authority over tribal
 sible for the current state of tribal-federal rela- lands and citizens; and on the other hand, creating a set of legal (some say
 tions. moral, i.e., "trust doctrine") barriers designed to protect tribes from federal
 agencies, states, and private parties. Marshall, of course, because of his
 enormous intellectual talent, his belief in federal supremacy, his compassion for tribes, and the important
 element of timing, is the principal federal figure responsible for the current state of tribal-federal relations.
 A number of writers have critically analyzed Marshall's comments in Cherokee Nation and his other
 important Indian law decisions (Burke, 1969; Deloria, 1983; Ball, 1987; Wilkinson, 1987; and Williams, 1990).4
 Though differing, sometimes vehemently, sometimesin tveheir interpretation of Marshall's doctrines, there is general
 concurrence that the gifted jurist blended his federalist convictions, a sense of moral l obligation to Indians,
 and a pragmatic need to find a way to reconcile tribal status in the constitutional framework (Burke, 1969).
 And while scholars will continue to debate the status of tribal sovereignty as it emerged from the Marshall
 court era, one would be on firm historical and political ground to argue that tribes, in the words of dissenting
 Justice Thompson in the Cherokee case, were indeed "foreign" to the United States. Thompson said:
 It is their political condition that constitutes their foreign character, and in that sense must the
 term foreign, be understood as used in the constitution. It can have no relation to local,
 geographical, or territorial position. It cannot mean a country beyond sea. Mexico or Canada is
 certainly to be considered a foreign country, in reference t the United States. It is the political
 relation in which one government or country stands to another which constitutes its foreign to
 the other (p.55).
 Thompson's dissent, it should be noted, played a significant role in Marshall's follow up decision, Worcester
 v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) which affirmed the distinct and independent status of the Cherokees
 and the supremacy of federally-negotiated Indian treaties over state laws.
 Why all this discussion about Marshall's early characterizations of tribes and their political relationship
 with the United States? First, to show that the utterances of Chief Justices are sometimes grounded in
 something other than constitutional or legal principles. And second, to show that while Marshall overtly
 manipulated the description of tribal status and the tribal-federal relationship, this did not bring tribes under
 the auspices of congressional power. Tribes were still perceived and treated as "foreign" by the Courts, the
 President, and the Congress.
 Hence, when George Bush issued his Indian policy on June 14,1991 (Weekly Compilation of Presidential
 Documents, Vol. 27, No. 25: 783-784), which supported the "government-to-government" relationship be-
 tween tribal nations and the United States, he was acknowledging the persistence of that same distinctively
 political relationship. Clearly, this relationship has experienced transformations and vacillations. Some of
 these include demographic (the gross decline of tribal populations contrasted by the steady rise of non-Indian
 populations) as well as political and legal changes, most of which were unilaterally inaugurated by the United
 States (see, for example, Ball, 1987). But notions of tribal cultural and political autonomy remain valid for
 many tribes, though for others it is more problematic (Prucha, 1985).
 _________________________ ~Descriptions of tribes as "governments" stem from their status as the
 The U.S. Constitution mentions Indians three original sovereigns of America with whom various European states and,
 times... later the United States, engaged in hundreds of legally binding treaties and
 -'"""""'~~~ ~~agreements. Clearly, the tribes' sovereign status (though Bush refers to
 such status as "quasi-sovereign, domestic-dependent") continued throughout the Colonial period, the Con-
 federation, the Northwest Ordinance, and the establishment of the Constitution.
 The U.S. Constitution mentions Indians three times: 1) twice Indians are excluded from official popula-
 tion tabulations for determining congressional representatives (Article 1, sec. 2, cl. 3 "...excluding Indians not
 taxed..." and the 14th Amendment, sec. 2, which also refers to "Indians not taxed"); and 2) Indians are expressly
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 referenced in the Commerce Clause (Article 1, sec. 8, cl. 3) which provides that Congress is empowered "To
 regulate commerce with foreign nations ... states ... and with the Indian tribes." The Commerce Clause is
 the only explicit source of power delegated to Congress. It is, moreover, a "power allocation among competing
 power users governed by the Constitution ... [but] it is not an ascription of power as between Congress and
 the tribes because the Indians were apparently not intended to be included and were in fact not included
 within the coverage of the Constitution" (Rottenberg, 1986: 411).
 Theoretically, the Commerce Clause should not extend to Congress any greater power over tribes than
 it exercises over states, though in historical and contemporary practice such has not been the case.5 For
 example, while the Supreme Court has held that "the sovereignty of the states is limited by the Constitution
 itself" (Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528, 548 (1984)), states enjoy legal and
 constitutional protection against arbitrary federal action because of the doctrine of enumerated powers.
 The question of enumeration represents one of the most problematic aspects of the political conflict
 between tribes and the U.S. In constitutional law matters not involving tribes, the Court has generally
 maintained, as it did in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), that the U.S. "is a government of enumerated
 powers" (p. 88). The Court acknowledged, as it has on many occasions, that the Constitution, "is not to be
 construed technically and narrowly," but went on to say that "it is still true that no independent and
 unmentioned power passes to the National Government or can rightfully be exercised by the Congress" (Ibid.).
 When Congress deals with tribes, however, additional variables are considered: e.g., the treaty, not
 constitutionally-defmined political relationship, and the pre- and extra-constitutional status of tribes. These
 features enable the Court to sometimes utilize implicit and non-constitutionally derived doctrines to justify
 judicial or congressional actions (e.g., wardship, "discovery" principle, "implicit divestiture," etc.) that would
 not withstand legal scrutiny if applied to any other individual or group. (Cohen, 1972 ed.: 170).
 The combined effect of these distinctive constitutional and non-constitutional features is illustrated by
 the statement that general congressional laws are inapplicable to Indian .-I. ..___._ __ __
 tribes, "if their application would affect the Indians adversely, unless con- ...the constitutional clauses already mentioned-
 gressional intent to include them is clear" (Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 commerce, enumeration, and treaty-making--
 (1884); Cohen, 1972 ed.: 173). Moreover, there is solid historical and plus the power of making war and peace do not
 constitutional support for the doctrine that "Congress has no constitutional explicitly grant the federal government the power
 power over Indians except what is conferred by the Commerce Clause and to regulate Indians or Indian affairs.
 other clauses of the Constitution" (Cohen, 1972 ed.: 90). More importantly,
 it must be remembered that the constitutional clauses already mentioned--commerce, enumeration, and
 treaty-making--plus the power of making war and peace do not explicitly grant the federal government the
 power to regulate Indians or Indian affairs. The Commerce Clause, the only explicit power, merely states
 that Congress will be the branch to treat with Indian tribes. A corollary to this principle of congressional
 enumeration, identified by Cohen, involved the power of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs who is
 authorized to oversee "the management of all Indian affairs [of the federal government]" but whose office
 over time came to be read as having the power of "the management of all the affairs of Indians" (Cohen, 1953:
 352).
 Having elaborated on the extra-constitutional status of tribes, let us nowbriefly describe individual Indian
 status; for it is this unique conjunction of rights individual and collective--in part that fundamentally
 distinguish Indians from the rest of the American populace. Before 1924 nearly two-thirds of all Indians had
 received federal citizenship via treaty provisions or individual allotments. Following World War I, the federal
 government unilaterally extended the franchise to all other Indians (43 St. 253), though Commissioner Leupp
 asserted as late as 1905 that there was no "authority of law to naturalize Indians" (1905: 60). This extension
 of citizenship did not, however, enfranchise tribes, and it did not impair preexisting tribal rights. Hence, there
 was now a class of people, Indians, with dual, later triple citizenship (when the individual states extended the
 franchise to Indians) (Martin, 1990).
 As federal citizens, Indians are ostensibly accorded the same constitutional safeguards and rights as other
 Americans. But national citizenship has not always proven an adequate shield of Indian political, civil, and
 especially, property rights. Why? To understand this we must analyze the Supreme Court case which most
 forcefully addressed, and in fact formalized the issue of multiple tribal citizenship. The major case is U.S. v.
 Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916). There, the Court held that an enfranchised Indian allottee was still subject to
 congressional power. Congress's power, said Chief Justice Van DeVanter, had both a constitutional (Com-
 merce) and an extra-constitutional (tribal "dependency") base. Van DeVanter said that "citizenship is not
 incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship and so may be conferred without completely
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 emancipating the Indian or placing them beyond the reach of congressional regulations adopted for their
 protection" (p. 598).
 In essence, and ironically, Nice served to seal the status of tribal Indians in perpetual legal and political
 limbo during an era when the federal government's primary policy goal remained detribalization, in-
 dividualization, and assimilation. Henceforth, tribal members who had secured citizenship were simul-
 taneously recognized as federal citizens and dependent peoples subject to overriding congressional authority.
 With this fascinating dichotomous status enshrined in federal law a logical question is: what exactly does
 federal citizenship really bestow upon tribal citizens? Ostensibly, it should mean that the federal government
 retains no more power to legislate Indian lives and property than it does the lives and property of any other
 citizen. In fact, however, the U.S. has asserted, at its discretion, plenary authority over the political affairs as
 well as the civil and property rights of not only tribes but individual Indians as well (Coulter, 1974,1979;
 Deloria, 1977,1985; Barsh and Henderson, 1980; Carter, 1976; Newton, 1984; and Ball, 1987).
 Congressional Plenary Power--What Does it Really Mean?
 In the preceding section we have analyzed a number of interesting topics, doctrines, and issues: triple
 citizenship, extra-constitutional status, exclusive federal (congressional) authority in the field of Indian affairs,
 and treaty-based tribal rights. In the ensuing section we look closely at one of the most intriguing doctrines
 in the field of political science, constitutional law, and Indian law and policy: plenary power. For this concept
 of plenary entails the soul of what is sometimes deemed a constitutional impasse with, on the one hand, the
 U.S. acknowledging the sovereignty of American Indian tribal governments, and, on the other hand,
 sometimes extending its allegedly politically superior position in relation to tribes.
 There is considerable disagreement among scholars and federal lawmakers on whether plenary power-
 -when defined as exclusive--is a necessary congressional power which only the Congress may exercise free of
 typical constitutional constraints because the Constitution cannot protect tribal rights because of their
 extra-constitutional status (Cohen, 1972 ed.; Deloria, 1985: Wilkinson, 1987); or whether plenary--when
 defined as unlimited and absolute--is an aberrant and non-democratic doctrine which Congress sometimes
 arbitrarily uses to oppress or even eradicate tribal or individual political, civil, or property rights (Krieger,
 1933; Cohen, 1948; Deloria, 1977; Newton, 1984; Ball, 1987; Kronowitz, 1987). We will see that both
 definitions have been utilized, but will argue that in the last twenty years or so the political branches have
 more correctly relied on their exclusive power to deal with tribes.
 First cited by the Supreme court in the seminal case, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824),
 plenary power has often been used by the federal courts in cases dealing
 ...plenary power has often been used by the federal with federal powers. It is a concept, however, which fosters confusion
 courts in cases dealing with federal powers. "because it conceals several issues which, for purposes of constitutional
 analysis must be kept clear and distinct" (Engdahl, 1976: 363). Engdahl
 incorrectly posits, however, that "no federal power is plenary in the full sense of the term, because as to all of
 them at least the prohibition of the Bill of Rights apply" (Ibid.). The U.S. Bill of Rights, as we noted earlier,
 are inapplicable to tribal governments because tribal nations were not created pursuant to the Constitution.
 While the Indian Civil Rights act (82 St. 77-80) applies certain portions of the constitutional Bill of Rights to
 tribal governments in regards to their activities over reservation residents, the Bill of Rights does not protect
 tribes or their members from congressional actions.
 The other more important factor promoting misunderstanding of the term plenary is because the concept
 "merge[s] several analytically distinct questions" (Ibid.). First, and especially important for our purposes,
 there is plenary meaning exclusive. This is the definition used most frequently when Congress enacts
 Indian-specific legislation, like the Indian Reorganization Act (48 St. 985), or when it enacts Indian Preference
 laws which withstand reverse discrimination suits (Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974)). This is an
 exclusively legislative power which the Congress may exercise in keeping with its policy of treating with tribes
 in a distinctively political manner or when deemed appropriate to provide a recognition of rights (i.e.,
 American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution, 92 St. 469) that Indians have been deprived of because of
 their extra-constitutional standing. As Deloria astutely notes:
 There may indeed be some kind of establishment of religious freedom for American Indians. If
 so, it is because Congress has dealt with the question of the practice of Indian religions and felt
 it to be necessary to extend the protection of federal laws further in the case of Indians than the
 Constitution allows it to extend to ordinary citizens. In this instance Indians are not to be regarded
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 as 'supercitizens'; rather the practice of Indian religion is to be regarded as under the special
 protections of the federal government in the same way that Indian water rights, land titles, and
 self-government are protected. Congress has always dealt with Indians in a special manner; that
 is why Congress and the federal court's cherish and nourish the doctrine of plenary powers in the
 field of Indian affairs" (1985: 247).
 Second, plenary is also defined as an exercise of federal power which may preempt state law. Again, the
 Congress's commerce power is an example, as is the treaty-making process, which precludes state involve-
 ment. Constitutional disclaimers that a majority of Western States had to include in their organic documents
 before they were admitted as states are also evidence of federal preemption.6 Finally, there is plenary meaning
 unlimited or absolute (Newton, 1984: 196, note 3). This third definition includes two subcategories: a) power
 which is not limited by other textual constitutional provisions; and b) power which is unlimited regarding
 congressional objectives (Ibid.). There is ample evidence in Indian law and policy of plenary power being
 applied to tribes by the federal government in all three ways.7
 When the U.S. Congress is exercising plenary power as the exclusive voice of the federal government in
 its relations with tribes, and is acting with the consent of the tribal people, then it is exercising authority in a
 legitimate manner. Also, when Congress is acting in a plenary way to preempt state intrusion into Indian
 Country, absent tribal consent, then it is properly exercising an enumerated constitutional power. However,
 when congress is informed by the federal courts that it has "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, and
 unqualified" (Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976 (1942)) authority over tribes and individual Indian
 citizens, something is fundamentally wrong. Canfield, writing in 1881, long before individual Indians were
 enfranchised, correctly observed that congressional power over tribes was absolute because tribes were
 distinct and independent, if "inferior" peoples, "strangers to our law, our customs, and our privileges." He
 went on to say that "[t]o suppose that the framers of the Constitution intended to secure to the Indians the
 rights and privileges which they valued as Englishmen is to misconceive the spirit of their age..." (p. 26-27).
 But by the time Mashunkashey was decided, in 1942, all Indians had been enfranchised and yet they were
 informed by the court that absolute power was a reality confronting them.
 In a constitutional democracy, defined as a system of governance that places formal limits on what
 government can do, even exclusive authority has some limits. Tribes, however, because of their extra-con-
 stitutional status, cannot rely upon express constitutional provisions, particularly those found in the Bill of
 Rights, to limit what the federal government or its constituent branches do. Unfortunately, because of the
 Nice case and the interpretations given that decision and others by the Rehnquist court, even individual
 Indians who should be entitled to constitutional protections as citizens, find that in the area of religious
 expression and belief the first amendment does not afford them the necessary protection to practice their
 religion or have access to sacred sites.
 For purposes of this paper let us return our attention to the present situation where, as we argued earlier,
 it appears that the Congress because of its exclusive constitutional allocation of authority to treat with tribes,
 is arguably more supportive of tribal self-determination, congressional plenary power (when defined as
 unlimited) not withstanding.
 A Return to Bilateral Relations
 General legislative support8 for tribal autonomy has been evident since a spate of federal activity and
 legislation in the 1970s9 focused on the disavowal, though not official renunciation, of the termination policy.
 Termination was to be replaced by a more enlightened, though still flawed,10 policy of tribal self-determina-
 tion. A crucial dimension in Congress' quest to facilitate improved relations with tribes centered on the
 problems tribal people faced in attempting to access sacred sites, utilize sacred objects, and practice
 traditional religions, as a result of inconsistent and sometimes insensitive federal administrative policies and
 practices which hampered the Indians' religious rights.
 The history of the federal government's ultimate goal of the destruction of American Indian cultural
 identity, especially aboriginal religions from the early treaty period through
 the 1920s is well documented (Prucha, 1979; Sewell, 1983; Barsh, 1986; The history of the federal government's ultimate
 Martin, 1991). Once tribal identity and all vestiges of culture had been goal of the destruction of American Indian cul-
 eradicated, Judeo-Christian ethics, beliefs, and institutions, officially sanc- tural identity...is well documented.
 tioned and financially supported by federal tax dollars as well as Indian
 treaty funds, a clear violation of separation of church and state doctrine, were to be the vehicle through which
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 this assimilation and Americanization were to take place. For much of this period, but beginning most
 systematically with Grant's Peace Policy in the late 1860s (see, for example, Prucha, 1976) various Christian
 denominations struggled mightily to impart their religion to tribal people. The freedom of religion that these
 groups exercised to full advantage, however, completely disregarded the religious views and rights of Indians.
 "By religious freedom," says Prucha, "they [Christians] meant liberty of action on the reservations for their
 own missionary activities. 'The Indians have a right, under the Constitution, as much as any other person in
 the Republic... to the full enjoyment of liberty of conscience; accordingly they have the right to choose
 whatever Christian belief they wish, without interference from the Government'" (Prucha, 1976: 57 quoting
 "Address of the Catholic Clergy..." 1874).
 In fact, despite the extension of the federal franchise to a majority of Indians under the 1887 General
 Allotment Act (24 St. 388), with the remainder receiving citizenship in 1924 (43 St. 253), the fundamental
 question of constitutional protection for aboriginal tribal religions and the constitutional prohibition against
 an establishment of religion, in this case, Christianity among the tribes, were non-issues until the late 1970s
 (Deloria, 1985: 245).
 Congress finally responded to the lobbying efforts of tribal people and non-Indian advocates of Indian
 rights by enacting the American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution (92 St. 469) in 1978. This joint
 resolution declared that henceforth, it would be the policy of the United States "to protect and preserve for
 American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of
 the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to, access to sales, use
 and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rites" (Ibid.).
 The fact of the resolution's enactment was a clear admission on the part of the Congress that American
 Indian religious rights had not been protected, in part because of the anomalous status of Indians as both
 citizens and subjects, as Nice had put it. Hence, Congress, exercising its plenary legislative authority (defined
 as exclusive) recognized a need to legislatively extend federal protection of religious rights to tribal individuals
 because the first amendment of the constitution failed to protect those rights (Deloria, 1985: 247).
 By the end of the 1970s the flurry of congressional activity ended as a recession and Reagan's budget ax
 took over. Congress continued to enact sporadic legislation (i.e., Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 (96
 St. 2519)) throughout the 1980s. However, a more significant development with potentially long range
 ramifications for tribes and the tribal-federal relationship began as a result of an investigative series which
 appeared in the Arizona Republic newspaper the week of October 4-11,1987. The series, entitled "Fraud in
 Indian Country: A Billion Dollar Betrayal," written by M.N. Trahant, Andy Hall, and Mark Shaffer, was a
 major investigation of the federal government's gross inability to meet the basic human needs of American
 Indians in the areas of health, natural resource protection and utilization, housing, protection from sexual
 deviants, and education. This despite expenditures of several billion dollars annually.
 In fact, noted the reporters, federal Indian programs "are a shambles, plagued by fraud, incompetence,
 and deceit and strangled by a morass of red tape that has all but destroyed their effectiveness" (Arizona
 Republic, October 4,1987: 1). This series prompted the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1987
 to form a Special Committee on Investigations, co-chaired by Arizona's senators, Messrs. DeConcini and
 McCain. The Committee was charged to "uncover fraud, corruption and mismanagement in American Indian
 Affairs, no matter where or to whom it led." Their two-year investigation included the examination of over a
 million and a half documents, many of which were subpoenaed; interviews with 2,010 current and former
 governmental officials and employees, tribal officials, energy leaders, etc.; visits with more than seventy
 recognized tribes; and twenty days of public hearings. The hearing transcripts alone span eleven volumes,
 totalling nearly 3,500 pages.
 This two-year investigation corroborated what the Republic's staffers had found in a short six-month
 period. While uncovering scandals and gross federal incompetence and corruption in a myriad of areas, the
 final report summarized the committee's findings in the following areas: corruption was rampant in the
 implementation of the Indian preference statute; numerous cases of Indian
 ...the principal problem was an anachronistic con- child sexual abuse by BIA employees were documented; gross mismanage-
 gressional and administrative paternalism that ment and theft of tribal resources was identified; poor quality and inade-
 denies to tribes and their citizenry genuine quately funded health care continued to be a major problem; there was
 autonomy. ample documentation of substandard housing; and a significant amount of
 tribal elite corruption was uncovered. In answer to its own question of why
 so much corruption, fraud, and mismanagement still pervaded federal institutions which serve Indians, the
 committee asserted that the principal problem was an anachronistic congressional and administrative
 50
This content downloaded from 141.166.178.205 on Wed, 16 Oct 2019 17:32:41 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 paternalism that denies to tribes and their citizenry genuine autonomy.
 In order to terminate such paternalism, the Committee urged the rekindling of negotiated agreements.
 Termed "New Federalism," this policy would consist of bilateral agreements with tribes that while continuing
 to provide required federal funding, would also for the first time in over one hundred years, "allow tribal
 governments to stand free independent, responsible and accountable" (Senate Rep't. 101-216,1989: 16).
 These agreements, it is important to note, would be entirely consensual, and would not affect any prior rights
 or obligations a tribe may have as a result of "treaties, former agreements, or existing claims against the U.S."
 (p.17). They would also not modify the tribes' current legal status or their jurisdictional standing in relations
 to tribes. In essence, tribes could choose to enter new agreements with the federal government which would
 finally recognize the tribal right to assume direct responsibility for their own affairs.
 Chairman Sidney Yates (D., Ill.), of the House Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcom-
 mittee called an oversight hearing in late November 1987 to address the charges made by the Republic's
 reporters. Secretary of Interior Hodel and Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer sought to
 address the newspaper's allegations. "In obvious frustration and perhaps to direct Chairman Yates' dis-
 pleasure, Swimmer suggested that the BIA moneys should be turned over to the Tribes to let them manage
 their own affairs. After Chairman Yates met with Tribal representatives on the Swimmer proposal... ten tribes,
 including our four Tribes, Quinault, Lummi, Jamestown S'Klallam, and Hoopa, volunteered to test the
 proposal" (Joint Testimony, Hearing on H.R. 3394, Oct. 3,1991). Thus was set in motion a potentially
 revolutionary set of events, although the Department of Interior and the BIA attempted, without prior
 consultation with the volunteer tribes, to thwart the process by proposing an amendment to the 1975 Indian
 Self-Determination Act which would have resulted in a transfer of resources but with minor effect on the
 existing BIA bureaucracy. More significantly, this proposal included language that would have waived the
 federal government's trust responsibility for programs assumed by participating tribes. The tribes effectively
 counter-attacked this measure and had it stricken before final enactment of the 1988 Self-Determination
 Amendments (Ibid., p. 2).
 By December of 1987, Congress (which also had to act in a capacity to force the BIA to desist from its
 subverting tactics), a recalcitrant BIA and tribal leaders had reached agreement in principle on the estab-
 lishment of the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project (TSGDP, n.d.: 10). Originally designed to
 allow ten tribesl1 (with another ten to be selected from a pool of tribal applicants) the opportunity to create
 their own budgets to address tribally-determined priorities, the project was enacted as part of the Appropria-
 tion Act of 1988 and later supplemented and clarified as Title III of the 1988 Amendments to the Indian
 Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (102 St. 2285, 2296). In the words of a Lummi leader:
 The Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project is our opportunity to open doors that may
 lead to a new Indian affairs agenda--one in which tribes will reestablish the formal government-
 to-government relationship between tribal governments and the U.S. government, a relationship
 that is inherent and intended in the treaties between our governments. This project will also
 release the 135-year federal bureaucratic hold on tribes so we can determine and manage our
 own governmental affairs and responsibilities ("Shaping Our Own Future," n.d.: 3).
 The TSGDP is considered "the most advanced expression of the policy of Indian Self-Determination"
 ("Shaping Our Own Future," n.d.: 6). Intended to reaffirm the political relationship between tribes and the
 U.S. based on the doctrine of consent, these experimental tribes have the opportunity to redesign programs,
 reallocate funds, and plan and deliver services appropriate to their citizens. More broadly, the Project tribes
 are empowered to actively promote economic, political, and social self-sufficiency through the transfer of
 federal funds which formerly flowed to the BIA, but which will now go directly to the tribes, once the tribe
 has negotiated an annual written funding agreement with the Secretary of Interior ("Shaping Our Own Future,"
 1991: 2-3).
 The timing of this policy experiment, beginning as it did a year before the Senate's Final Report on the
 regnant corruption and incompetence lacing the BIA and virtually every federal agency which administers
 programs for Indians, indicates that the political branches of the federal government, at least, in this instance,
 are operating proactively and not defensively. Originally a five-year policy experiment to involve twenty tribes
 and slated to end in 1993, it was recently extended by legislation on December 4,1991 (105 St. 1278). The
 extension involves time (an additional three years) and tribes (from 20 to 30). The extension was requested
 by tribes and agreed to by Congress to allow more time for an evaluation of the program on a wider
 cross-section of tribes.
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 Predicting either the direction or substance of Indian policy is impossible. And it is far too early to tell
 what will come of the idea of "New Federalism" or the TSGDP. However, unlike the 1975 Self-Determination
 Act which was stymied by inadequate funds, old alliances involving BIA staff
 Predicting either the direction or substance of at the local and area level and certain tribal officials, and, most importantly,
 Indian policy is impossible. the fact that it actually returned very little direct governmental power to
 tribes, the current process of self-governance, because of direct tribal
 involvement, including more experienced tribal leaders, plus the procedural and substantive safeguards
 included in contracted agreements, has significantly greater potential to return tribal-federal relations to a
 level closely resembling the position outlined in the original Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
 The task will not be easy, particularly when the tribes are confronted by a bloated and inefficient BIA
 bureaucracy that is more interested in preserving its institutional existence than in supporting tribal self-deter-
 mination. The tribes involved in the TSGDP are committed, however, to the program. It is also evident that
 the Congress is generally supportive as is the Bush Administration, notwithstanding the occasional, if
 predictable, actions of certain Interior Department personnel.
 We move our attention now to the federal courts, particularly the activities and inactivities of the supreme
 court which is heading off into its own direction, congressional plenary (exclusive) authority, New Federalism,
 and Tribal Self-Governance notwithstanding.
 Judicial Supremacy in Decision-Making
 A survey conducted by the Los Angeles Times in the summer of 1991 revealed some interesting results
 regarding overall public sentiment on the Supreme Court. The findings indicate that the American public
 holds a generally favorable view of the court (53 percent favorable, 23 percent unfavorable, 24 percent haven't
 heard enough); believes that the Court is ideologically situated about where it should be and is neither too
 liberal nor too conservative (50 percent say it is "just about right," 26 percent say it is "too conservative," 15
 percent say it is too liberal, and 9 percent are not sure); and says that the Court's present position in the
 American system of separation of powers is just about right (63 percent say the Court has just the "right
 amount of power," 12 percent say it is "not powerful enough," 21 percent say that it is "too powerful," while 4
 percent are not sure) (The Ladd Report, 1991: 24-26).
 With regard to recent Supreme Court decisions, the Times study shows clearly, but not surprisingly, that
 while the public is not very knowledgeable about details of the Court's activity, they have vacillating opinions
 depending on the issue involved. This survey, however, did not pose a question about the Court's recent
 Indian cases. But one could hazard a guess that had they queried the general public on cases like Duro, Cotton
 Petroleum, Smith II, and Lyng, the response would have been virtual silence, since tribal issues are even more
 peripheral than everyday political and social topics. As Deloria notes in a recent article, even more surprising
 than the opinion of Justice Scalia in Smith II and O'Conner in Lyng has been "the absence of any sense of
 outrage from American Christians" (1991c: 23).
 Had the pollsters interviewed American Indians, on the other hand, both as to their overall perception
 of the Court as well as their attitudes about specific cases, the results, more
 ...the religious rights of American Indians, al- than likely, would have been far less flattering. In fact, contrary to
 though explicitly recognized by the Congress in Washburn's contention in a 1984 article that "there is no question that the
 the 1978 Religious Freedom Resolution, have been religious rights of American Indians, after hundreds of years of assault, are
 devastated by federal court activity. more fully protected than ever before" (p. 53), virtually all the data emanat-
 ing from the federal courts, even before 1984 (see Table III) show that just
 the opposite is transpiring--the religious rights of American Indians, although explicitly recognized by the
 Congress in the 1978 Religious Freedom Resolution, have been devastated by federal court activity. The
 majority of the cases, not coincidentally, have been decided since the Religious Freedom policy directive.
 Table III entails the major federal court cases involving questions related to Indian religious freedom.
 Note that only Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council (1959) is a substantial victory for the tribes.
 This case, however, did not involve a federal, state, or private activity in direct conflict with the rights of
 American Indians to protect their religion or access to sacred sites. Instead, it was an important case affirming
 the inapplicability of the constitutional first amendment to tribal governments.
 What explains the other ten cases, nine of which were handed down in the years subsequent to Congress'
 policy directive on the issue? Why is the Court acting in a way that directly clashes with congressional goals
 and intent, particularly in regard to religious freedom for Indians? And why is it that for the Indians, both
 individually and as tribes, despite the federal and state citizenship status tribal individuals have, the
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 Table III:
 Federal Court Activity Regarding American Indian Religious Freedom
 Quick Bear vs. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908): Treaty funds; First Amendment-Establishment (Tribe: Lakota)
 Holding: Federal statute prohibiting appropriations to sectarian schools only applied to
 gratuitous appropriations and public moneys, not Indian treaty funds, which were paid by the
 government to fulfill treaty provisions.
 Native American Church vs. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 131 (1959): Applicability of First Amendment
 to Tribal Nations; peyote (Tribe: Navajo)
 Holding: First Amendment does not restrict actions of tribal governments on question of
 religious freedom.
 Sequoyah vs. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F. 2d 1159 (6th Cir., 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980):
 First Amendment-Free Exercise; sacred Indian sites--Chota, TN (Tribe: Cherokee)
 Holding: Cherokees' interest in protecting land was not sufficiently "religious" to invoke First
 Amendment protection.
 Badoni vs. Higginson, 638 F. 2d 172 (10th Cir., 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981): First Amendment--
 Free Exercise; sacred Indian sites on "public" lands--Rainbow Bridge, AZ (Tribe: Navajo)
 Holding: Navajo religious use of Rainbow Bridge, however indispensable to Navajo life, could
 not outweigh the economic benefits (electricity and tourism) generated by the Glen Canyon Dam.
 Fools Crow vs. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd., 706 F 2d 856 (9th Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 464
 U.S. 977 (1984): First Amendment--Free Exercise; sacred Indian sites on "public" lands--Bear Butte, SD
 (Tribes: Lakota, Cheyenne and others)
 Holding: Tourism and other development do not pose a "substantial burden" to the Indians' free
 exercise of religion. Promotion of tourism is a "compelling" state interest.
 Wilson vs. Block, 708 F. 2d 735 (D.C. Cir., 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1984): First Amendment--Free
 Exercise and Establishment; sacred Indian sites on "public" lands--San Francisco Peaks, AZ (Tribes: Navajo
 and Hopi)
 Holding: U.S. Forest Service may expand ski resort area on federal land despite Indian arguments
 that the expansion would desolate the area and violate their religious rights.
 Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope vs. US., 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), affd., 746 F. 2d 570 (9th
 Cir., 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 820 (1985): First Amendment--Free Exercise; sacred area--Arctic Sea
 (Tribe: Inupiat)
 Holding: Federal government may grant petroleum leases despite Inupiat assertions of religious
 use and aboriginal title.
 Bowen vs. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986): First Amendment--Free Exercise; administrative policy (Tribe: Abenaki)
 Holding: Free exercise does not require the government to conduct its internal affairs (requiring
 an Indian child to have a Social Security number) in ways that comported with the religious beliefs
 of citizens.
 Lyng vs. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988): First Amendment--Free
 Exercise; sacred Indian sites--Chimney Rock area of northern California (Tribes: Yurok, Karok and Tolowa)
 Holding: Denied free exercise challenge to federal highway project that will destroy Indian
 religious sites.
 US. vs. Means, 858 F 2d 404 (8th Cir., 1988): First Amendment--Free Exercise; public lands--Black Hills,
 SD (Tribe: Lakota)
 Holding: U.S. Forest Service did not violate Free Exercise clause in denying Sioux Indians a
 special permit to use 800 acres of national forest as a religious, cultural and educational
 community.
 Employment Division vs. Smitth, 1105 Ct. 1595, 108 L. ed. 2d 876 (1990): First Amendment--Free Exercise;
 peyote; state criminal law (Tribe: Klamath)
 Holding: The Free Exercise clause permits the state to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus
 to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use.
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 constitution's first amendment protections do not apply in any fundamental way? These are the questions we
 attempt to answer in this last section of the article.
 Before setting out our explanations it behooves us, first, to assert our position that the Court is a
 policy-making institution. Next, we must describe what this assertion means, since it is often made without
 explanation. Dahl once observed that "as a political institution the Court is highly unusual, not least because
 Americans are not quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution, and not quite capable of
 denying it" (1957: 278). Clearly, the Court is not an ordinary political institution, however. It is, first of all, a
 court of law. Second, there is an obvious interrelationship between law and politics. Finally, the Court can
 best be understood in terms of the interaction between and merger of two traditions which are identified as
 the "legal subculture" and the "democratic subculture" (Richardson and Vines, 1970). The precise spot on
 the continuum where the Court settles to render a decision is usually determined by several factors: the issue
 before the court; the court's composition (who is sitting on the bench); and the court's ideological complexion.
 Viewing the Court as having a political dimension and studying it from a political perspective facilitates a
 sharper understanding of it for several reasons: 1) it helps define the Court's contribution to the determination
 of public policy decisions; 2) it enables us to formulate a more accurate picture of the Court vis-a-vis other
 governmental institutions; and 3) it enables us to describe and understand the recruitment of judicial
 candidates and the Court's decision-making process in terms similar to the ones used to describe say, the
 recruitment of political candidates and how and why they vote as they do (Grossman and Wells, 1988: 3-4).
 Three Theories of Judicial Decision-Making
 Scholarly views regarding the Court's stance in national policy-making are disparate, but can generally
 be grouped in one of three categories: the court as legitimator, as initiator, or as an imperial entity. First,
 let us look at the legitimacy perspective. Briefly, Dahl (1957) and Funston (1975) have corroborating views
 that the Supreme Court has not, generally speaking, substituted its policy goals for those of law-making
 majorities, and that even when the Court has sought to do that, it has not been very successful. The main task
 of the court, according to Dahl, is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the dominant alliance.
 A court is, of course, an active participant in the ruling national coalition which dominates U.S. politics, but
 it fails to perform the task of protecting fundamental minority rights against majority demands that is often
 attributed to it. Why? Because as a member of the ruling coalition, its decisions are typically supportive of
 the policies emerging from the political branches. Theorists of this school do acknowledge that the Court is
 more than an agent, acting solely to confer legitimacy on the political branches decisions. But for Dahl, the
 court is cautious and will avoid blatant opposition to the dominant alliance for fear of losing its legitimacy.
 This theory has been challenged by scholars like Casper (1976) and Choper (1980) who recognize in the
 Court's litigative record a more active role which holds that the judicial arm has more staunchly, albeit in
 sporadic fashion, defended basic liberties and minority rights by exercising its authority to act as an initiator
 of public policy if necessary. While the political branches have at times been more sensitive to certain personal
 liberties than the Court, the usual pattern is the opposite. On issues such as slavery, public financial assistance
 to sectarian schools, individual liberty and the conflict of internal security, and the political and socio-
 economic rights of racial minorities, "[C]ongress has recognized that political expediency often renders it
 impotent to uphold the constitutional rights of vulnerable minorities and that it would not be displeased to
 have the Court set the record straight" (Choper, 1980: 68).
 Theorists of this school draw a picture of the Court's actions which extends far beyond those of
 legitimation alone. Casper (1976) carefully dissected Dahl's analysis and argued that the Court will often
 seize the initiative and will create policies other institutions are unwilling or unable to promulgate (p. 60).
 The Court, said Casper, is not only far more active--it has struck down legislation more frequently today than
 when Dahl's article appeared (1957), but its decisions largely have not been reversed by legislation, constitu-
 tional amendment, or by a reversal by the Court.
 Furthermore, Casper noted that Dahl's analysis was flawed because it was based upon the premise that
 policy-making is best described in terms of influence and power, winners and losers. The Supreme Court's
 policy-making process is far more than a win-lose, zero-sum situation, argued Casper. It is, instead, a dynamic
 process "in which even 'losers' contribute importantly to outcomes that eventually emerge" (pp. 61-62). In
 short, conflicts among political institutions produce not "winning" and "losing" policies but rather "tentative
 solutions that themselves become the basis for future policy-making." Examples of contested but largely
 unresolved issues include the fishing rights struggles of the Great Lakes and Northwest Coast regions, racial
 equality, legislative reapportionment, church-state relations, and criminal procedure.
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 The third theoretical perspective, most forcefully articulated by Agresto (1985), and the one most
 pertinent for our discussion, posits as its central premise that the court is an imperial body wielding judicial
 supremacy. Agresto says that the Supreme Court is imperial not as a result of its activism, nor is it imperial
 simply because its decisions are largely "unchecked." "It is imperial," Agresto argues, and exceedingly
 dangerous because it is active and unchecked in its ability to be the creator, the designer, of new social policy.
 The Court has the "unhindered ability not simply to prevent legislative acts but to govern affirmatively outside
 the boundaries of either checks and balances or democratic traditions" (p. 11). While recognizing that the
 court is entitled to exercise judicial review, Agresto believes the Court has gone too far and operates without
 any restraints on its activity (p. 37). This is the paradox, according to Agresto: How, he asks, can we allow
 the Court to be powerful and let it be the developer of fundamental principles without substituting its own
 principles for the Constitution (pp. 156-157).
 Agresto believes that the will of the national majority enacted into law will generally contain enough
 protection for the rights of minorities (p. 30). Interestingly, he sees the court as only "marginally connected
 to democratic choice." The justices, "unelected, life-tenured, with secure salaries, have plenary power over
 the interpretation of the nation's fundamental law and authority to direct private and public activity in accord
 with their opinion of the demands of that Constitution. And when the Court uses that authority to stand
 against the democratic will or to direct public policy, we are unsure what to think, much less what to do about
 it" (p. 36).
 For Agresto, the solution to judicial supremacy is for the three branches to begin acting as partners, as
 though they were coordinate with one another. Congress, according to Agresto, especially needs to reassert
 its authority to interpret the Constitution. "If the Court has decided wrongly Congress should... force a
 reconsideration of the constitutional issue. Just as the Supreme Court should encourage Congress to engage
 in sober second thinking, so too should Congress engage the Court in such thinking" (Kommers, 1985: 120).
 Not surprisingly, one can find evidence in Indian history, law, and policy supportive of each of these
 policy-making positions utilized by the Court.12 But it is Agresto's theoretical perspective of an imperial
 judiciary that most accurately capsulizes the Rehnquist Court's collective attitude and recent decisions,
 particularly on the subject of Indian religious freedom. This is most evident when we compare the court's
 activity over the last decade or so with the enactments and policy directives adopted by the political branches.
 In fact, it is fairly evident based on the cases diagrammed in Table III that the religious rights, practices, and
 beliefs of both tribes and individual Indians are considered as belonging not to the actual practitioners
 themselves, but to the subjective domain13 of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court in this area of law
 deems itself as the "ruler" of the polity rather than as an interpreter of the Constitution or congressional
 enactments. The Court is no longer checking legislative actions or legitimating congressional or executive
 activity; nor is it acting in a dynamic way to address social and political issues that the Congress or President
 are negligent in addressing. Instead, it is involved in a revolutionary attempt to reshape Indian societies and
 their belief systems in a manner consistent with what the Court deems appropriate and in direct contradis-
 tinction to what the political branches are supporting. "More often," says Kommers, the Court in recent years
 has not guided constitutional dialogue or served as a generator of "sober second thought in the larger political
 community." It has instead, "stopped the conversation, concluded the argument, and foreclosed any policy
 other than the one it has mandated" (1985: 120). This certainly seems to be the case when questions of
 American Indian religious rights come before the Court.
 The Rehnquist Court and Indian Rights
 There is general agreement that the Supreme Court is functioning in an imperial manner when it comes
 to the subject of American Indian religious rights (see, for example, Sewell, 1983; Barsh, 1986; Loftin, 1989;
 Wyatt, 1989; Boyles, 1991; Deloria, 1988,1989a, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, and 1992). Restating our original
 question: Why has the court consistently failed to extend constitutional first amendment protection to Indian
 and tribes in the area of religion despite the 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Resolution which
 Congress enacted as part of its plenary exclusive authority; and 2) Why is it that despite triple citizenship--
 tribal-federal-state--individual Indians still lack enforceable constitutional rights to practice their traditional
 religions.
 These are not easy questions to answer. For despite explicit legislative and citizenship recognition of
 tribal religious rights, it is true as Riker and Weingast observe that "rights are not sufficient to guarantee
 liberty. A guarantee at least requires, in addition, appropriate governmental structures, appropriate tradi-
 tions of civility, and other related factors" (1988: 375). Unfortunately, because of the distinctive nature and
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 basis of tribal rights, pre- and extra-constitutional in their origin, it is difficult to ascertain what kind of
 "appropriate governmental structure" is available to protect tribal rights. As we noted in the beginning of this
 paper, that is why the Congress is empowered with plenary exclusive authority to address the special needs
 and collective rights of tribes--because tribal rights are protected neither by the Constitution nor the Bill of
 Rights. And although "traditions of civility" are certainly relevant and have contributed to the protections of
 Indians and minority rights on occasion, they have proven to be an unreliable and unenforceable basis on
 which tribes could hope to have their rights shielded from governmental infringement.
 ._.... _._?__ _____ _ There are, we would argue, three14 plausible, interrelated and some-
 ...the Rehnquist Court has become an imperial times overlapping, reasons why the Rehnquist Court has become an im-
 entity intent on crafting its own social policy, perial entity intent on crafting its own social policy in contradistinction to
 what the Congress and the Bush administration is supporting for tribes: 1)
 the alleged cultural and spiritual inferiority of indigenous cultures belief systems; 2) individualism-assimila-
 tion; and 3) federalism, Rehnquist style.
 Cultural Inferiority: Petoskey (1985), Deloria (1989a), and Echohawk (1989) have argued that a principle
 reason the justices are unwilling to recognize the religious rights of Indians is because tribal religious
 experience and sentiment are not considered as entailing real religious expression and are therefore "not to
 be taken seriously" (Deloria, 1989:12). It is also argued that tribes cannot expect justice because the federal
 court jurists view tribal religious claims through Judeo-Christian values and therefore are unable or unwilling
 to grasp the value of tribal views of the world which differ radically from those of western industrialized nations
 (Petoskey, 1985: 221). 15
 Individualism-Assimilation: Closely related to the first explanation is an argument broached by Holm
 who asserts that the Court seems to be resurrecting notions of individualism-assimilation along the lines of
 those of the late nineteenth century Christian reformers. Those reformers, it will be recalled, were convinced
 that the destruction of tribal religions were essential before the processes of Americanization, Christianiza-
 tion, and Civilization could evolve.
 The modern court disavows the use of such blatantly ethnocentric language as "primitive," "savagery," and
 "barbarism," but their arguments, though couched in much less graphic language, amount to something quite
 similar. In short, the Court seems to be pushing the view that if tribal sacred sites are destroyed, and if the
 use of sacred plants like peyote are restricted or forbidden, then this may eventually force both tribes and
 individual Indians to abandon their aboriginal spiritual ways. Presumably, those deculturalized Indian
 individuals would then adopt traditional Judeo-Christian religious doctrines and values. Justice Hugo L.
 Black issued a stinging dissent in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 124
 (1960), which typifies an opposite, more tolerant view of tribal culture and the indigenous person's relation-
 ship to the land. It was, however, a minority judicial perspective in 1960, and it is most certainly a minority
 view today. In this case the Tuscarora Nation, which had treaty-recognized rights and fee-simple title to much
 of their reservation, lost their case before the supreme court and had nearly a quarter of their territory "taken"
 for the construction of a hydroelectric power plant. Justice Black, decrying this act of confiscation of tribal
 land as violative of federal law, Indian policy, and as a "breach of Indian treaties," (p. 125) noted:
 These Indians have a way of life which this Government has seen fit to protect, if not actually to
 encourage. Cogent arguments can be made that it would be better for all concerned if Indians
 were to abandon their old customs and habits, and become incorporated in the communities
 where they reside. The fact remains, however, that they have not done this and that they have
 continued their tribal life with trust in a promise of security from this Government (p. 141).
 In a closing line, Black uttered one of the Court's most famous (or infamous) lines: "Great nations, like great
 men, should keep their word" (Ibid.).
 This second argument individualism-assimilation--is more problematic and less evident than the first one.
 It is plausible, we argue, because while the Court until recently operated from a more affirmative role in the
 areas of religious tolerance and civil rights than earlier in its history, its recent decisions in the areas of civil
 rights (especially those involving the criminally accused, minority men, women, and reverse discrimination)
 seem more intellectually and philosophically grounded in a historical time known as "classical legal thought."
 This period emerged between the 1850s and the 1880s and lasted until about 1940 when the Court was far
 less interested in protecting civil liberties and individual freedoms (Kennedy,1980).
 This historical era witnessed the development of an alliance between legal treatise writers, leaders of the
 American bar, and Supreme Court justices who shared a particular conception of law that went beyond old
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 conflicts. These legal elites allied with science against what Kennedy called "the crudities of democratic
 politics" (p. 4). Fundamental to Kennedy's arguments is the notion of "legal consciousness," which he says
 must be recognized and confronted. This consciousness operates to distinguish the Court from other political
 institutions. For Kennedy, legal consciousness has a "measure of autonomy." "It is," he argues, "a set of
 concepts and intellectual operatives that evolves according to a pattern of its own, and exercises an influence
 on results distinguishable from those of political power and economic interest" (p. 4).
 The importance of this concept, for purposes of understanding the Court's Indian case law, are such that
 an extended quotation is called for:
 The autonomy of legal consciousness is a premise; yet that autonomy is no more than relative.
 Not only the particular concepts and operations characteristic of a period, But also the entity that
 they together constitute, are intelligible only in terms of the larger structures of social thought
 and action.
 This approach denies the importance neither of ideologies like laissez-faire, nor of concrete
 economic interests, nor of the underlying structure of political power. It insists only that legal
 consciousness, which has its own structure, mediates their influence on particular legal results...
 (p.4) ...The notion behind the concept of legal consciousness is that people can have in common
 something more influential than a checklist of facts, techniques, and opinions. They can share
 premises about the salient aspects of the salient aspects of the legal order that are so basic that actors rarely if ever
 bring them consciously to mind. Yet everyone, includin g actors who think they disagree profound-
 ly about the substantive issues that matter, would dismiss without a second thought... an approach
 appearing to deny them. These underlying premises concern the historical background of the
 legal process, the institutions involved in it, and the nature of the intellectual constructs which
 lawyers, judges, and commentators manipulate as they attempt to convince their audiences" (p.
 6).
 While consciousness, broadly put, refers to the essence of opinion, attitudes, goals, theories, emotions, and
 sensibilities held by an individual or group, legal consciousness more particularly refers to that type of
 consciousness that the legal profession as a social group holds at a given moment (p.23). Unlike basic
 individual or group consciousness, however, legal consciousness is differentiated because of legal rules, ideals,
 arguments, and legal theories operational at a given time.
 Historical examples of Supreme Court decisions which evidence that body's unique consciousness on
 Indian and tribal status, rights, and identity are legion.15 More importantly, in the last fifteen years both the
 Burger and now the Rehnquist court's have adopted, for certain purposes, a political stance which clearly
 evidences is own legal consciousness in a way that perpetuates a number of stereotypes and myths about
 tribes and tribal-federal relations. For instance, the Court held in U.S. v. Wheeler that tribal sovereignty
 existed "only at the sufferance of Congress" (435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); in Oliphant v. Suquamish, the Court
 stated that "upon incorporation into the territory of the U.S. the Indian
 tribes thereby came under the territorial sovereignty of the U.S. and their ...in the last fifteen years both the Burger and now
 exercise of se of separate power is constrained so as not to conflict with the the Rehnquist court's have adopted, for certain
 interest of this overriding sovereignty" (435 U.S 191 (1978)); and in U.S. v. purposes, a political stance which clearly eviden-
 Sioux Nation it was determined that Congress had "paramount power over ces its own legal consciousness in a way that per-
 the property of the Indians" (448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980)). Neither of these petuates a number of stereotypes and mythese
 three cases contain evidence of any form--historical, political, constitution-
 al, or legal--which justifies the Court's expressions "sufferance," "overriding
 sovereignty," or "paramount" congressional authority over tribes. These are legal fictions developed by the
 court to satisfy its own political and social agenda (see, for example, Ball, 1987).
 More pertinent to this article are the recent religious cases where the court has argued, for instance, that
 notwithstanding the fact that logging and road building would have "devastating effects on traditional Indian
 religious practices..." "the Constitution," said Justice O'Connor, "simply does not provide a principle that could
 justify upholding respondents' [Indians'] legal claims" (Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Association, 485
 U.S. 439,451-452 (1988)). Furthermore, in Employment Division v. Smith (108 Led. 876 (1990)), the majority
 held that while "it would doubtless be unconstitutional" for example, "to ban the casting of statues that are to
 be used for worship purposes, or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf' it was declared constitutional,
 on the other hand, for a state to impose general prohibitions against the use of peyote, even though the law
 infringed on the individual's practice of his religion. But Blackmun noted in a powerful dissent in Smith, that
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 "if Oregon can constitutionally prosecute them [Indians] for this act of worship, they, like the Amish, may be
 forced to migrate to some other more tolerant region...." ...This particularly devastating impact must be
 viewed in light of the federal policy--reached in reaction to many years of religious persecution and
 intolerance--of protecting the religious freedom of Native Americans" (pp. 912-913).
 Ironically, in both Lyng and Smith the factual disputes prompting both cases has since been resolved in
 a way that should have averted the litigation in the first place. For instance, the construction of the six-mile
 stretch of road which was disputed in Lyng has been abandoned (Deloria, 1991b: 286); and in Oregon the
 legislature has since enacted regulations that allows an "affirmative defense" for anyone using peyote "in
 connection with the good faith practice of a religious belief, as directly associated with a religious practice,
 and in a manner that is not dangerous to the health of the user or others who are in the proximity of the user"
 (Oregon Revised Statutes, 1991, Vol. 8: 37-83, 37-84).
 Two other cases should suffice as evidence indicating a unique "legal consciousness." In a 1991 case,
 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Potawatomi, a unanimous court held that "Congress has always been at liberty
 to dispense with such tribal [sovereign] immunity or to limit it" (51 CCH S.Ct.Bull. p. B932). Finally, in a
 January 1992 case involving the Yakima nation, Justice Scalia, writing for a majority, uttered a statement which
 typifies the regnant legal consciousness of the Rehnquist Court. Scalia noted that while "the Yakima Nation
 argues that state jurisdiction over reservation fee land is manifestly inconsistent with the policies of Indian
 self-determination and self-governance that lay behind the Indian Reorgani7ation Act and subsequent
 congressional enactment this seems to us a great exaggeration" (Yakima v. County of Yakima and Dale Gray,
 60 USLW 4067, 4071). Blackmun, the lone dissenter challenging the majority's powerful and apparently
 entrenched consciousness, quoted from McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (441 U.S. 164, 179
 (1973)) where a unanimous court held that they were "far from convinced that when a State imposes taxes
 upon reservation members without their consent, its actions can be reconciled with tribal self-determination."
 In the Yakima case Blackmun could find no legitimate constitutional or statutory basis on which the Court
 based its reversal of long-standing federal policy. In fact, the Bush administration filed an amicus brief in
 support of the Yakima's contention that if the Congress had not explicitly authorized state taxation of fee
 patented lands within a reservation then the state was precluded from acting to tax those lands.
 The third factor that may help explain the court's Indian case law involving questions of religious freedom
 centers on the doctrine of federalism, with the active participants being Congress, the federal courts, and the
 states. While the interactions of these three entities can be troublesome enough, the introduction of tribes
 which are non-federal entities, along with individual Indians, who because of triple citizenship must be viewed
 through a different set of lenses, depending on the power source involved, makes this an extremely
 problematic area.
 There is abundant evidence, first of all, that as a partner in the ruling national alliance, the court will
 usually support the federal government's position, particularly if there is a conflict between federal power
 and tribal sovereignty (Dahl, 1957; McCulloch, 1991). This dimension is rarely disputed and has persisted
 since Marshall's trilogy of cases in the early 1800s (Burke, 1969). But it is the Rehnquist court's orientation
 towards state's rights that has generated major concern among tribes and individual Indians (Burton, 1991;
 Lawson and Morris, 1991).
 One could hypothesize, and there is good evidence to affirm, that the more deferential a Supreme Court
 justice is to the traditional powers of state government, "the more likely he or she will be to vote in favor of
 the States and against the Indians whenever a jurisdictional conflict between the two occurs" (Burton, 1991:
 39). Furthermore, one could test the hypothesis that over the last two decades, which encompass both the
 Burger and Rehnquist courts, that as the Court has leaned more towards a reassertion of states' rights it has
 become less supportive of tribal rights. This second hypothesis has been tested and confirmed in the area of
 water rights (Burton, 1991) and natural resource issues (Holland, 1989). And it has been implicitly confirmed,
 though not necessarily systematically tested, in the area of free exercise of religion (see Deloria, 1989a, 1991a,
 1991c, 1992; Gordon, 1991; Moore and DeCoteau, 1991; Brooks, 1990; Martin, 1990; Wyatt, 1989; and Barsh,
 1986). Finally, there is also some evidence showing that the Supreme Court is extremely sensitive to instances
 where tribal activities will have an adverse affect on non-Indian citizens and interests of the states, particularly
 if the state lacks jurisdictional authority to regulate the tribal activity (Kramer, 1986: 991).
 This issue is more complex, however. We can conceive of a large set of legal relationships in the United
 States--i.e., private citizens to private citizens, private citizens to states, legislature to judiciary, federal to
 state, tribal individual to tribal government, tribal individual to state government, tribal individual to federal
 government, tribal government' to state, and tribal government to federal government. Each of these,
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 including the first four sets of relationships which do not explicitly involve Indian actors, can have an effect
 on tribal or individual rights.17 And the role of the states has certainly become more prominent under both
 the Burger and Rehnquist courts. In fact, Rawlings posits that the Court has recently developed a trend of
 "setting aside spheres in which it allows the government (both state and federal, depending on the issue) to
 assert almost unchallenged authority in making laws that infringe on individuals' free exercise rights" (1991:
 585-586).
 Conclusion
 We have spent considerable time and energy analyzing the relationship between tribes and individual
 Indians and the Congress, on the one hand, and the relationship between tribes and individual Indians and
 the U.S. Supreme Court. There is currently a yawning chasm dividing the way the federal government's
 political branches, especially the Congress, and to a lesser, though still vital sense, the executive (though the
 BIA is an uncooperative partner in the new process of self-governance) and the Supreme Court conceptualize
 tribal political status, sovereignty, personal and collective property rights, and individual tribal members' civil
 liberties. Historically, tribes received little support from the U.S. Congress on central issues of property,
 self-governance, religious freedom, etc. And there is still nothing inherent in the political process, much less
 in the constitutional structure to guarantee that the federal government's political branches will not engage
 in infringements of the political or property rights of tribes or individual Indians. There is, however, at the
 present a vital effort by the political branches, supported by a growing number of tribes, to resuscitate the
 process of bilateral agreements which would restore some semblance of tribal autonomy to those tribes who
 choose to participate.
 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has struck out on its own and has imperially stripped American
 Indian individuals and tribes of their right to practice traditional religions and frequent sacred places if those
 rights appear to clash with the property rights of federal agencies or state interests. Tribal individual and
 indigenous governments, however, are not idly sitting by while the Court dismantles their religious (or other)
 rights. Ably supported by concerned congressional representatives, various Christian denominations, Indian
 and non-Indian lobbying and interest groups and pan-Indian organizations (i.e., Association on American
 Indian Affairs, Native American Rights Fund, National Congress of American Indians, and various "Green"
 groups) and even an occasional state government (i.e., California in the Lyng case), American Indians have
 and are vigorously seeking legislative action to counter the negative effects of several Rehnquist Court
 decisions. Tribes and their supporters have already been successful in securing enactment of a 1991
 congressional law (105 St. 646) which overturned a major criminal law case, Duro v. Reina (58 USLW 4643
 (1990)) which had effectively deprived tribal governments of their right to exercise misdemeanor criminal
 jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
 Legislation has already been introduced (See Table II) to rectify the serious constitutional problems the
 Court's Indian religion cases have generated. Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D., New York), for instance,
 introduced H.R. 2797, the "Religious Freedom Restoration Act," on June 27,1991 which, if enacted, would
 reverse "the disastrous effects of a dastardly and unprovoked attack on our first freedom by the Supreme
 Court of the United States." (Congressional Record, 1991:E2422). Reciting the essence of the Smith case
 which eliminated the first amendment's requirement that government "accommodate the religious practices
 of all Americans unless it can demonstrate that the burden imposed is the least restrictive means available to
 achieve a compelling state interest," Solarz' bill seeks to prohibit the government from burdening a person's
 free exercise of religion, "even if that burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it can
 demonstrate that the governmental action is essential to further a compelling governmental interest and that
 it is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest" (Ibid.).
 Simultaneously, a broader based effort is underway by the aforementioned intertribal and intra-organiza-
 tional alliance, with a core of traditional Indian people, in an effort to get redress by Congress. A new omnibus
 religious freedom bill will be introduced sometime in 1992 which will not only address the court's recent
 litigation, but will probably also encompass a new federal policy designed to provide real, that is to say, legally
 enforceable, rights of action and some enforcement mechanism which the original 1978 resolution lacked.
 There is hope that such legislation, in conjunction with Congress' own current political consciousness which
 is geared towards a recognition of aboriginal rights, would act to protect American Indian religious rights
 (Deloria, 1991c: 24; Boyles, 1991).
 Even if these bills fail of enactment, there is still room for optimism, at least for tribal citizens. In his
 most recent and one of his most provocative works on this emotionally-charged subject, "Trouble in High
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 Places: Erosion of American Indian Rights to Religious Freedom in the United States" (1992), Deloria offers
 a brilliant analysis of what he terms "the three major paths" that federal Indian law has and continues to
 travel--the treaty relationship, the Trust Doctrine, and federal property ownership of public lands.
 After critically assessing the advantages and pitfalls of each of these "possible theories" of the tribal-
 federal relationship, Deloria engages in a critical analysis of the Lyng case and shows 1) how a negotiated
 settlement, formulated along the lines of the former treaty-agreement process could have been used to settle
 this religious dispute without the need for litigation; 2) how the federal government's so-called "trust
 responsibility" which should have operated to protect the sacred sites of the California tribes, was instead
 completely negated by the O'Connor majority; and 3) how the property rights of the United States are defined
 by the Court and pertinent federal agencies as if they [the property] "belongs to them [government employees]
 personally, and that any effort by the public to participate in management is a personal affront" (1992: 287).
 Deloria, however, ironically and astutely suggests that within a few years the Lyng case might actually be
 recalled as a "positive landmark by Indian people," though O'Connor and her majority cohorts certainly did
 not intend for this to result. Deloria says this is a distinct possibility and suggests that "Lyng may have been
 a necessary step in replacing the Trust Doctrine with the treaty settlement process, thus reversing a
 century-long trend of making the treaty rights a function of the willingness of the federal entity to fulfill its
 promises" (p. 286). We should all, Indian and non-Indian alike, hope he is right.
 Notes
 1. The Bush Administration on June 14,1991 issued its position reaffirming the political relationship between tribes and the U.S.
 Bush asserted that his administration was intent on "fostering tribal self-government and self-determination" (Weekly Compilation of
 Presidential Documents, Vol. 27, No. 25: 783-784).
 2. Tribes qua Tribes are not citizens and remain extra-constitutional entities not subject to either the U.S. Constitution's
 constraints or eligible for its protections.
 3. Tribal nations are sovereign since they were not created pursuant to the federal constitution. Thus, the Bill of Rights does not
 apply to the acts of tribal governments and limits on state and federal power delineated in the federal constitution cannot constrain
 tribal governing powers. Tribes, for instance, may legally discriminate against non-tribal and non-member Indians in voting solely on
 the basis of race (Indian Civil Rights Act, 82 St. 77); the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by grand jury doe snot apply to
 prosecutions in tribal courts (Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)); and as separate sovereigns tribes enjoy sovereign immunity (Santa
 Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,56 (1978)).
 4. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
 5. Vine Deloria, Jr. has forcefully made this argument on several occasions. But see Felix Cohen (1972 ed.: 91) who asserts with
 minimal proof that the Congress' power over tribes, in addition to the treaty-making power, gives the Congress "much broader" power
 over the tribes than over commerce "between states." On the previous page Cohen more accurately noted that "Congress has no
 constitutional power over Indians except what is conferred by the Commerce Clause and other clauses of the Constitution."
 6. Washington State's Constitution, Art. XXVI, Second, contains an example of one such disclaimer: "That the people inhabiting
 this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lyingwithin the boundaries
 of this state, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the title thereto shall
 have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States, and said
 Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States...."
 7. In the period when unlimited congressional power was first sanctioned, U.S. v. Kagama (1886), to the time when the Supreme
 Court first said there might be some limits to such authority, U.S. v. Perrin (1914), plenary power was explicitly cited by the Supreme
 Court in nearly a dozen cases, beginning with Stephens v. Cherokee Nation (1899) and ending with Sizemore v. Brady (1914). As
 recently as 1991, the Supreme Court asserted that "Congress has plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs" (Cotton
 Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 57 USLW 4445 (1989): 27). The best analytical study of plenary power remains Nell Jessup Newton's
 excellent article "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitation" University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132
 (1984):195-288.
 8. I must reiterate my view that while Congress has generally been supportive of tribal self-determination it is still the case that
 a fundamental asymmetry exists between the U.S. and the tribes. These larger structural and philosophical issues, including Congress'
 self-arrogated assumption of a superior political position over tribes, have been treated admirably by others. See Milner Ball's excellent
 article, "Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes," American Bar Foundation Research JournaL 1 (1987): 1-139; and Nell Jessup Newton's
 piece, "Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations." University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 132 (1984): 195-288;
 for good samples of such work.
 9. See, for example, Richard Nixon's Indian Policy in 1970; the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act in 1971; the Indian Education
 Act of 1972; Menominee Restoration in 1973; Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act in 1975; the American Indian
 Policy Review Commission, established in 1975, etc. Consult Francis P. Prucha's Documents of United States Indian Policy, 2nd
 edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990) which contains nearly all the major policies for this and prior years.
 10. Numerous studies have shown that the Indian Self-Determination Policy had serious structural, economic, and philosophical
 problems that effectively precluded it from actually encouraging genuine tribal autonomy (Gross, 1978; Champagne, 1983; Nelson and
 Sheley, 1985; and Stuart, 1990).
 11. The original tribes were: Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, Hoopa Tribe, Jamestown Band of S'Klallam, Lummi Indian
 Tribe, Mescalero Apache Tribe, Mille Lacs Chippewa Tribe, Quinault Indian Nation, Red Lake Chippewa Tribe, Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
 and Tlingit and Haida Central Council.
 12. In fact, a number of scholars have argued that, all things being equal, the Supreme Court has acted more often as a legitimator
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 of the activities emanating from the political branches (Barsh and Henderson, 1980; Newton, 1984: 234; Kramer, 1986; Ball, 1987; Riker
 and Weingast, 1988; and Williams, 1990). The Court's usual deference to Congress is best evidenced by the persistence of the political
 question doctrine in the field of foreign affairs and the fact that the Courts have never declared an act af Congress unconstitutional
 with regards to the United States right to diminish tribal sovereignty or aboriginal rights (Coulter, 1978: 35). While the political question
 doctrine has been repudiated by the Court (Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977) and U.S. v. Sioux Nation
 of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980)) in the area of Indian law, the judicial arm still generally defers to congressional decisions regarding
 federal power over tribal property and tribal sovereignty (Newton, 1984: 235). As a federal court of appeals said in Buster v. Wright,
 (135 Fed. 947 (1905) appeal dismissed by Supreme Court 203 U.S. 599 (1906)), "the opinion of the legislative and executive departments
 of the government... while not controlling upon the court's are entitled to great deference and grave consideration" (p.954-955). This
 judicial deference has often compromised the rights of Indians as well as other minorities (Riker and Weingast, 1988: 399).
 There is also ample evidence in which the Courts acted as initiators of policywhen it was determined that Congress was not acting
 fast enough. See, for example, Washington v. Fishing Vessel Association, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) where the court fashioned a pragmatic
 set of rules which set the future pattern for enforcement of treaty rights in migratory fish in the Northwest coast: including reaffirmation
 of the major rule that it was logical to establish a 50% share of the harvestable run as the "ceiling" for the Indian fishery.
 13. Thanks to Mr. Rudolph Coronado, Jr. for this term.
 14. I welcome comments, ideas, and suggestions from readers who might wish to add or explicate this list.
 15. I owe a special debt to Dr. Tom Holm who through numerous conversations with me over the past two years has convinced
 me that the Rehnquist Court is actively engaging in an effort to revisit the spirit of the late 1800s, which persisted into the early twentieth
 century, when the dominant issues considered by the Court centered on economic regulations, the sanctity of private property, and
 legitimating the rise of corporate power. We have already described how federal policies of the era were designed to assimilate and
 acculturate Indians into mainstream America.
 16. Racism, ethnocentrism, and the perceived "superiority" of western institutions and values are vividly displayed in a myriad of
 Supreme Court cases. See, for example, U.S. v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 (1913) which referred to Indians as 'degraded;" and U.S. v.
 Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 which said Indians were "wards." See Nancy Carol Carter's "Race and Power Politics as Aspects of Federal
 Guardianship Over American Indians: Land-Related Cases, 1887-1924, American Indian Law Review, 4 (1976): 197-248.
 17. In my dissertation, which was an analysis of the major Supreme Court cases from 1870 to 1921 (90 in all), the data revealed
 that in nearly one-half of the cases, 43 in all, there was no tribal or individual Indian represented as a direct party to the case. In other
 words, in nearly 40% of the cases while an issue or subject matter of importance to Indians was being litigated, there was no direct
 Indian or tribal involvement. This is a startling figure and indicates an absurd reality. It is a reality which entails the realization by
 tribal people, frequently after the fact, that their civil and political rights, as well as their property rights, may be diminished or enlarged
 without the benefit of any Indian involvement (Wilkins, 1990: 76).
 The classic example of this type of case with no Indian involvement is Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). While
 this case has been hailed by many as the preeminent tribal sovereignty case, in fact, tribes were not involved. The active parties were
 several anglo missionaries and the State of Georgia.
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